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Abstract: We examine the effects of the legal reform passed in 2012 in Spain to protect 
mortgage debtors. Under the new regime, it is difficult for low-income debtors who 
meet certain requirements to be evicted. In the case of default, the bank is forced to 
offer the debtor a restructuring of the debt, or the debtor can even, as a last resort, 
transfer the property to the bank as an alternative to having the lender foreclose on it, 
thus being allowed to stay in the property as a tenant and paying a reduced rent, and 
avoiding eviction even after foreclosure. We consider quarterly data from 50 Spanish 
provinces (NUTS III regions) from 2001 to 2019(Q3). We use panel data models with 
regional, year, and quarter fixed effects, linear and quadratic region-specific time trends, 
and other relevant control variables at the regional level (house prices, inflation, and 
unemployment rates), and our results reveal that the reform significantly reduced the 
number of foreclosures, but that this effect was transitory, fading six years after the 
reform. However, the negative effect on the mortgage loans market was permanent 
throughout the period under consideration. 
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1. Introduction 
The 2008 global financial crisis and its subsequent economic and political shockwaves 
were widely linked to housing policy failures in North America and Europe. Fields and 
Hodkinson (2018) and Aalbers (2016) highlight the way in which encouraging home 
ownership and asset-based welfare while failing to regulate high-risk lending fuelled 
both an unsustainable housing boom and a toxic asset bubble in housing-backed 
financial instruments. As a result, the later housing crisis had an international scope, 
headlined by housing market crashes across wealthy countries and the loss of millions 
of homes to foreclosure, with the United States and Spain hit the hardest (Beswick et 
al., 2016). In this paper, we focus on the Spanish case, studying the effectiveness of the 
political measures implemented to mitigate the effects of the unprecedented wave of 
foreclosures and evictions following the crash of the Spanish housing bubble. 
The last decade of Spanish economic history has been difficult; before the Great 
Recession, Spain had unemployment rates of around 8% (INE, Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística), but the rate reached more than 25% in 2012 and 2013, three times the rate 
during the economic expansion period. One of the consequences of the financial crisis 
was the dramatic collapse of the housing bubble; from 2008 onwards, prices fell for six 
years in a row (Martín et al., 2019). 
As Parreño Castellano et al. (2019) indicate, “between 1996 and 2007 6.5 
million new residences were built in Spain (Romero, et al., 2012), while average prices 
grew by 135%.” Consequently, household debt in the form of mortgage loans rose from 
66.1% to 167.9% of GDP (Parreño Castellano et al., 2019). During these years, several 
institutional characteristics made the Spanish economy especially prone to suffering a 
housing bubble. Jimeno and Santos (2014) and Martín et al. (2019) enumerate these 
characteristics: “the banking sector was able to attract capital inflows, construction 
firms had built up large capacities during earlier infrastructure projects, and the Spanish 
population was young and growing fast” (Martín et al., 2019, p. 8). 
Changes in zoning and land use regulations in 1997 and 1998 (the new Law 
6/1998 on land regime), an oversized construction sector, weak lending standards (loan-
to-value ratios close to 100% in many cases) particularly in regional banks controlled by 
local political elites (Akin et al., 2014), growing demand due to the increase in the 
population (both nationals and foreigners, particularly in tourist regions), and the 
2 
 
speculative behaviour of some institutional and private buyers also helped to sustain the 
growth in house prices, housing stock, urban space, and mortgage loans (García, 2010). 
Figure 1 shows the evolution in house prices at the national level from 1994 to 
2019(Q3), along with the number of new mortgages1 granted in this period to secure 
loans to buy urban properties. The evolution of house prices illustrates the recent 
Spanish housing boom. As Blanco et al. (2016) explain, from the middle of the 1990s to 
2007 the housing market was characterised by an extraordinary boom, which multiplied 
house prices by a factor of more than three. In particular, between 1995 and 2007 the 
average annual rate of increase of house prices was 9.7%, with a maximum of over 17% 
in 2003 and 2004. After 2008, during the Great Recession, house prices dramatically 
decreased. It is worth pointing out that house prices and the number of new mortgages 
display a similar evolution in most of these years, although in 2006 the number of new 
mortgages reached a maximum historical total of 1,842,925 and then started to decrease, 
while house prices maintained their positive growth for two more years until 2008 when 
they also began to decline. The most recent data show that from 2015 there has been a 
recovery in both the number of mortgages and house prices. 
Two specific factors in Spain contributed to strengthening the impact of the 
shock on households’ finances. The first of these is the Spanish regulatory regime. The 
basic laws are the 1946 Mortgage Law and its subsequent amendments, and the general 
rules of the Civil Code (Private Law). Most households need credit from a bank to buy a 
house, and a mortgage secures the repayment of the loan. Thus, if the borrower defaults 
and there is judicial foreclosure, the property securing the mortgage loan is sold in a 
public auction. What we want to emphasize is that in Spain (as in many European 
countries) the general rule is that, in case of default, if the judicial foreclosure does not 
result in full repayment of the existing debt, because the sale price is substantially lower 
than the appraised value at the time of the loan agreement, the liability of the debtor 
remains and the debt subsists for the remaining amount under the principle of personal 
liability given in Article 1911 of the Civil Code, which states that “the debtor is liable 
for the performance of his obligations with all present and future property”.2 
                                                 
1There are no available data on the stock of existing mortgages.  
2
 The New York Times highlighted the negative impact of this personal liability on households in Spain 
during the Great Recession: “In Spain, Homes are Taken but Debt Stays”, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/28/world/europe/28spain.html.  
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Second, Spaniards show a strong preference for property ownership rather than 
renting. As Blanco et al. (2016) point out, “in Spain, property ownership is widely 
viewed as superior to renting almost as a social status”. As a result, the rental market is 
far less developed in Spain than in other European countries. According to the last 
Spanish population census in 2011, owner occupancy rates are (on average) around 
78.9%, while the rental share is around 13.5%. Dewilde (2008) provides some statistics 
on the housing market for 12 European countries; her calculations, based on national 
micro-data from the European Community Household Panel in the period 1995–2001, 
reveal that the percentage of households in owner occupation in Spain is the highest 
(84.9%) in her sample of countries. Only Greece shows a similar figure, while other 
European countries are far below: Portugal (66.7%), France (63.1%), Germany (44.4%), 
and the United Kingdom (71.8%). Thus, given that the proportion of owners was much 
higher than that of renters in Spain, the exposure of households to the bursting of the 
housing bubble was considerably more serious than in other countries. 
The sudden end of the housing bubble meant that a proportion of the 319 billion 
euros in mortgage loans could not be paid back, generating an unprecedented wave of 
foreclosures and evictions in the country (Parreño Castellano et al., 2019). Figure 1, 
showing house prices and judicial foreclosures by year from 2001 to 2019(Q3), 
illustrates the magnitude of the shock at the national level. Eviction data, when 
available, are also shown. The graph shows that, starting in 2008, when the 
unemployment rate increases rapidly as a result of the economic crisis, the number of 
foreclosures rises (doubling in just the two years from 2008 to 2010) until it reaches a 
maximum in 2015 that is four times the figure for the year 2008. The maximum number 
of foreclosures also coincides with the peak in evictions. After 2015, both foreclosures 
and evictions decline over time. Moreover, it can be observed that the increase in 
foreclosures coincides with the decrease in house prices. 
This situation of social tension resulted in the foundation of several associations 
(the most prominent being the Association of those Affected by Mortgages – 
Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca). In February 2013, these social movements, 
among other actions, led to a popular legislative initiative3 with over 1,402,854 
                                                 
3
 A popular legislative initiative is a direct and participatory democratic mechanism for the population in 
public affairs. A group of people can submit a non-governmental bill to parliament, but no fewer than 
500,000 authenticated signatures are required. The 1978 Spanish Constitution adopted the most restrictive 
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signatures that requested that debtors could transfer their property over to the bank as an 
alternative to having the lender foreclose on it (a so-called ‘dación en pago’ or datio in 
solutum), asked the government for a social rent for low-income debtors, and called for 
a moratorium on all evictions. Prior to this, in January 2012, the Ombudsman (Defensor 
del pueblo) had published a report entitled Economic Crisis and Mortgage Debtors: 
Actions and Proposals of the Ombudsman, which contained a series of 
recommendations including that “we must seek solutions with practical results 
equivalent to the transfer of property in payment of debts”, especially “for essential 
purchases, such as the habitual residence.” 
As a result, the government and parliament introduced several new rules, 
reforming the banking sector and creating new instruments to protect low-income 
mortgage debtors at risk of eviction: 
o Royal Decree-Law4 8/2011, July 1, on support measures for mortgagors, control 
of public spending and debt cancellation for businesses and individuals 
contracted by local institutions, the promotion of entrepreneurship and impulse 
of building rehabilitation and the administrative simplification. 
o Royal Decree-Law 6/2012, March 9, on urgent measures to protect mortgage 
debtors without resources. 
o Royal Decree-Law 27/2012, November 15, on urgent measures to strengthen the 
protection of mortgage borrowers. 
o Law 1/2013, May 14, on measures to strengthen the protection of mortgage 
borrowers, on debt restructuring, and on social renting. 
o Law 14/2013, September 27, on support measures for entrepreneurs and 
encouraging them to engage in international trade. 
o Royal Decree-Law 1/2015, February 27, on the mechanism of the second 
chance, the reduction of financial burdens and other measures of social order. 
o Royal Decree-Law 5/2017, March 17, to modify Royal Decree-Law 6/2012, 
March 9, concerning urgent measures for protecting mortgage debtors without 
                                                                                                                                               
popular legislative initiative model (a final decision is made by parliament and there is no possibility of a 
referendum) among decentralised countries (Virgala, 2012). 
4
 A Royal Decree-Law is a legal rule having the force of a law approved by the government under very 
specific circumstances: There must be a situation of extraordinary necessity that requires certain measures 
that must be implemented urgently (and cannot be carried out by the normal parliamentary process, which 
may be slow). A Royal Decree-Law is temporary and must be ratified, rejected or converted into law by 
parliament within 30 days of its publication. 
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resources, and Law 1/2013, May 14, on measures to strengthen the protection of 
mortgage borrowers, to restructure debt, and to boost social renting. 
o Law 5/2019, March 16, regulating real estate credit agreements. 
Among these rules, the most important was the Royal Decree-Law 6/2012. 
Under this new regime, low-income debtors who meet certain requirements can only be 
evicted with difficulty and, in case of default, a bank must offer the debtor a 
restructuring of the debt, or the debtor can even, as a last resort, transfer the property 
over to the bank as an alternative to having the lender foreclose on it. 
This rule established a new Code of Good Practice for banks and financial 
institutions; although accession to this Code is voluntary, once an institution has agreed 
to adhere to the Code (and over a short time almost all Spanish banks did) it is obliged 
to offer a borrower who is having difficulties with the payment of his or her mortgage 
debt the option to apply for the measures included in the Code.  
Mortgagors protected by the Royal Decree-Law 6/2012 are borrowers under a 
loan secured by mortgage on their first residence when the resulting mortgage payments 
exceed 50 percent of the net income received by all the members of the household. The 
restructuring plan for the mortgage debt consists of the joint implementation of different 
measures in a sequential way. First, if the borrower’s difficulties are considered to be 
temporary (and the bank still expects to be fully repaid in the end), some of the terms in 
the loan agreement can be modified, allowing the bank to offer the debtor: 
a) A five-year grace period for the repayment of capital; 
b) An extension of the repayment period to a total of 40 years from when the loan 
was granted; 
c) A reduction in the applicable interest rate to the Euribor rate + 0.25 percent 
during the grace period; and 
d) An indefinite agreement not to apply interest rate floor clauses (also known as 
‘collar clauses’) in the mortgage loan contract.5 
It is also possible to combine debts owed to the bank. 
                                                 
5
 The European Court of Justice ruled on December 21, 2016, that the typical ‘floor clauses’ included in 
mortgage loans in Spain were null and void. Previously, Royal Decree-Law 1/2015 had established that 
floor clauses in mortgage contracts for mortgage debtors without resources could no longer be applied. 
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Second, if the application of the above measures is considered to be unfeasible 
because the restructuring results in a monthly payment of over 50 percent of the total 
income received by all members of the household, the mortgagor has the option to apply 
(within one month after the unfeasibility of the restructuring plan has been 
acknowledged) for the implementation of additional measures consisting of a reduction 
of the debt, although the bank is not obliged to accept this application. These additional 
measures are: 
a) A reduction of 25 percent of the loan; 
b) A reduction equivalent to the difference between the repaid capital and the total 
capital in the same proportion as the number of installments paid bears to the 
total due; 
c) A reduction equivalent to half the difference between the current value of the 
residence and the value resulting from subtracting from twice the initial 
appraised value the difference with the loan granted, as long as the first value is 
lower than the latter. 
Third, if the restructuring plan and additional measures are not viable, the 
mortgagor may within 12 months from the application for restructuring, request 
payment in kind of his residence as a means of definitively discharging the debt, where 
the lender is obliged to accept the handover of the mortgaged property. Moreover, the 
debtor is allowed to stay in the residence as a tenant for two years, paying an annual rent 
of 3% of the total amount of the debt at the time of the payment in kind, thus avoiding 
eviction even after foreclosure. 
Although some later rules modified the Royal Decree-Law 6/2012,6 we can 
identify this rule as the first serious attempt by the government to reduce the number of 
foreclosures and evictions. Between 2012 and 2019(Q2), 115,475 applications were 
received by banks adhering to the Code. Of these, only 57,885 (50.1%) were accepted 
and processed. The most common reason for a rejected application was that the 
mortgage debtor did not meet the income threshold. Among the accepted applications, 
49,725 (85.9%) were solved through changes in the terms of the loan agreement, in 
thirteen (0.0%) cases the bank accepted a reduction of the debt, and, finally, the bank 
acquired possession of the property securing the mortgage loan in payment of the loan 
8,147 (14.1%) times. 
                                                 
6
 For instance, the Royal Decree-Law 1/2015 slightly modifies the Code of Good Practice. 
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Other European countries that also faced a dramatic increase in foreclosures and 
evictions passed similar law reforms (Domurath et al., 2014). For instance, the Greek 
Law 4161/2013 introduced the ‘facilitation scheme for performing borrowers’, which 
can only be applied to debts arising from housing or credit or ‘repair’ loans that have a 
mortgage lien to the primary residence of the debtor. And in Portugal, in case of default 
of a debtor in a harsh economic situation, under Law No. 58/2012 the credit institution 
is obligated to present a plan for restructuring the mortgage loan and offer additional 
measures, such as credit consolidation, if necessary. 
However, what is relevant from the perspective of this economic analysis of the 
law is that this new set of rules introduces a new mechanism of incentives that can lead 
to undesirable results. Lacruz Mantecón (2014) indicates that this new overprotection of 
debtors (i) may cause a reduction in mortgage credit, especially for those groups that the 
law seeks to protect (individuals at risk of economic exclusion), and (ii) can induce 
strategic defaults (when the appraisal value of the property is higher than the current 
market value —i.e., underwater mortgage). To these negative effects we could add that 
it is not clear whether these “urgent” measures have really contributed to a significant 
reduction in the number of foreclosures in the short term. For example,  Figure 1 shows 
a decrease in judicial foreclosures and evictions in recent periods, but the reason could 
be the economic recovery rather than the new legal measures. In this paper we test all 
these hypotheses empirically. 
We use panel data models considering quarterly regional data. One potential 
limitation of the analysis is that the law reform affected all regions at the same time, and 
thus we do not have a control group within Spain. Nevertheless, we include regional, 
year, and quarter fixed effects, linear and quadratic region-specific time trends, along 
with other relevant control variables at the regional level, and our empirical strategy 
distinguishes between the static and the dynamic effects of the law reform. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data 
used. In Section 3, we describe the methodology and the main results. Section 4 
concludes. 
2. Data 
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We consider quarterly data from the 50 Spanish provinces (NUTS III regions).7 
The available judicial foreclosures data cover the period 2001 to 2017 (General Council 
of the Judiciary, Consejo General del Poder Judicial, CGPJ). We use data from 
completed foreclosure procedures in the courts of first instance.8,9 Chapter V of the Law 
of Civil Procedure 1/2000 (Articles from 681 to 698) regulates the foreclosure process 
in Spain. The execution of the foreclosure process is a civil procedure under Spanish 
law. The process is based on a debt enforcement of the mortgage deeds by filing a 
lawsuit. Article 681 regulates the process for demanding payment of a debt secured by a 
pledge or mortgage. The article states that “enforcing the payment of debts secured by 
pledge or mortgage may be executed directly over the property”. The main requirement 
for the action is the existence of a public mortgage deed that has been signed at a 
notary’s office and filed at the land registry. The deed must include specific 
requirements for the lender’s rights to be executed over the mortgaged property, namely 
the price at which the mortgage property is valued (based on an official appraisal), 
which serves as a base price for the auction, and the debtor’s domicile for the purpose of 
notices and requests. 
The data on evictions are more recent; the data series starts in 2013. As the time 
span of the series is short (data are only available for 27 quarters, from 2001(Q1) to 
2019(Q3)), and the law reform took place in 2012, before the first data are available, we 
restrict our analysis to the foreclosures data. Nevertheless, the correlation between the 
two variables (foreclosures and evictions) at the regional level is quite high (0.9),10 so 
we expect that our conclusions regarding the effect of the law on judicial foreclosures 
can be extended to evictions.   
House prices are new house prices (i.e., recently built houses) measured in euros 
per m2 (Spanish Government, Ministerio de Fomento). Regional house prices are 
available for a longer time span (1994-2017), but foreclosures data are only available 
from 2001 onwards, which restricts our sample to the 2001-2019(Q3) period. The house 
price variable allows us to detect possible opportunistic behaviour of debtors, telling us 
whether changes in house prices could have led to strategic defaults when, after a fall in 
the current market value of a property, the new house price is lower than the equity (i.e., 
                                                 
7
 Ceuta and Melilla, located on the African coast, are excluded. 
8
 The courts of first instance are the basic courts of civil jurisdiction assigned to judicial districts. 
9
 In Spain almost all foreclosures are judicial, although the law allows for non-judicial foreclosures before 
a notary. 
10
 Spearman’s rho = 0.9358 with 1,350 observations. 
9 
 
the value of the property less the balance of the outstanding mortgage loan on the 
home). 
The spatial scale is an important issue. Figure 2 plots judicial foreclosures by 
region, and significant differences across regions can be observed (Parreño Castellano et 
al., 2019). As Méndez et al. (2015) indicate, the increase in foreclosures showed a 
spatial pattern: coastal regions (Mediterranean regions, specifically) exhibit higher than 
average increases in foreclosures, while northern regions, along with some inland 
provinces, had lower than average increases in the number of foreclosures. The two 
most populated regions (Madrid and Barcelona) and their surrounding areas also 
recorded a higher than average rise in judicial foreclosures. This regional variation 
becomes even more apparent when we consider house prices, as Figure 3 shows. Blanco 
et al. (2016) studied the existence of convergence clusters among Spanish regions, on 
the basis of house price trends from 1995 to 2007, concluding that some degree of 
segmentation in the Spanish housing market exists. For instance, their results confirm 
that the housing boom was much more pronounced in coastal provinces, particularly on 
the Mediterranean coast.  
We also want to study whether the legal reform had any effect on the mortgage 
loans market. Loans data at the regional level come from the General Council of the 
Notary (Consejo General del Notariado, CGN). We have quarterly information on the 
total number and average amount of regional mortgage loans from 2007 to 2019(Q3). 
This data set is comprehensive and reliable because, in Spain, the notary intervention is 
mandatory in order to get access to the Land Register. Thus, a notary has to witness the 
deeds of sale so that the the private sale contract is turned into a public a deed that can 
be inscribed in the official property register, and registration is always requested when 
the mortgage lender is a bank or financial institution. 
We also collect data on two macroeconomic variables that may have an 
influence on foreclosures and loans: the unemployment rate and the inflation rate. We 
use unemployment to control the regional business cycle, and inflation is related to the 
cost of living. Unemployment data come from the Spanish Labor Force Survey. As 
mentioned in the introduction, there have been considerable fluctuations in 
unemployment in Spain, and the variations at the regional level are also relevant and 
persistent over time (Jimeno and Bentolila, 1998). 
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Regarding inflation, Spain reports consistently higher inflation rates than other 
European Union (EU) countries. Lopez and Papell (2012) studied the behaviour of 
inflation rates among several EU countries during recent decades: until 2008, Spain was 
one of the Euro countries reporting the highest inflation rates, then Spain was one of the 
countries most affected by the 2008 crisis and, finally, after the crisis Spain’s inflation 
rate shows a moderate decrease. Our measure of the inflation rate is the rate of change 
in the consumer prices index. 
Finally, we also use data on population at the regional level to calculate relative 
measures for foreclosures and loans per capita. Population data are available at the 
regional level for two dates per year, in the first and the third quarters. We fill in the 
data for the other two quarters using linearly interpolated values. 
Table 1 shows the regional average values by year for all these variables over 
the period under consideration. If we focus on the years around 2008 (at the beginning 
of the Great Recession), we can identify different dynamics: unemployment and 
foreclosures increase from 2008, while house prices, inflation, and the number and 
average amount of loans decrease from that date but recover in recent years.  
3. Methodology and Results 
The main hypothesis that we wish to test is whether the recent law reforms of the 
Spanish mortgage market to protect mortgage debtors without resources had a 
significant effect on the number of foreclosures. Our empirical strategy distinguishes 
between the static and the dynamic effects of the law reform. Initially, to capture the 
effects of the law reform, we estimate the following expression: 
௜ܻ௧ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚଵ ∙ lnሺܪ ௜ܲ௧ሻ ൅ ߚଶ ∙ ܷܰܧܯ ௜ܲ௧ ൅ ߚଷ ∙ ܫܰܨ௜௧ ൅ ߛ ∙ ܮܽݓܴ݂݁݋ݎ݉௧ ൅ ߠ௜ ൅ ߜ௧൅ T௜௧ ൅ ݑ௜௧ 
 (1) 
where ௜ܻ௧	 is the dependent variable, a measure of the number of judicial foreclosures in 
region i at time t. We consider two measures: the log-number of judicial foreclosures 
and the number of foreclosures per 1,000 inhabitants. ܪ ௜ܲ௧, ܷܰܧܯ ௜ܲ௧, and ܫܰܨ௜௧ 
represent the house prices, unemployment, and inflation rates in region i at year t, 
respectively. ܮܽݓܴ݂݁݋ݎ݉௧ is a dummy variable that takes a value of “1” after the 
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mortgage law reform, and “0” otherwise. As explained in the introduction, among the 
different rules introduced in recent years, the most important was the Royal Decree-Law 
6/2012; thus, we set the law reform date at March 11, 2012, when this rule entered into 
force.  
The estimate of the parameter ߛ in Eq. (1) informs us about the average change 
in the dependent variable after the law reform, controlling for fixed and time-specific 
shocks (year and quarter fixed effects are included), represented by ߠ௜ and ߜ௧, 
respectively. T௜௧ is a matrix of time variables, incorporating region-specific linear time 
trends (


1
1
Re
n
i
ti Timegion ) and quadratic region-specific time trends (



1
1
2Re
n
i
ti Timegion ), allowing us to control for unobserved regional characteristics that 
vary over time.  
However, the law reform may also have induced gradual changes in the number 
of foreclosures because the banks and financial institutions only gradually joined the 
new Code of Good Practice. To tackle this issue, we also estimate the dynamic response 
of foreclosures to the 2012 law reform using the following econometric model: 
 
௜ܻ௧ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚଵ ∙ lnሺܪ ௜ܲ௧ሻ ൅ ߚଶ ∙ ܷܰܧܯ ௜ܲ௧ ൅ ߚଷ ∙ ܫܰܨ௜௧ ൅ 
൅෍ߚ௞௞ஹଵ ∙ ݀௞	௒௘௔௥௦	௦௜௡௖௘	௟௔௪	௥௘௙௢௥௠,௜௧ ൅ ߠ௜ ൅ ߜ௧ ൅ T௜௧ ൅ ݑ௜௧ 
(2) 
This model differs from the previous one because we introduce dummies to 
capture the dynamic effect of the shock. Thus, the variable ܮܽݓܴ݂݁݋ݎ݉௧ is now a set 
of dummies ݀௞ equal to “1” when the law reform has been effective in year t for k 
periods, and “0” otherwise. We include dummy variables for the first two years of the 
new legal regime, and for years 3 and 4, 5 and 6, and 7 and 8 (until Q3 in 2019).11 
                                                 
11
 As the law reform became effective after the beginning of the year 2012 and we have quarterly data, 
this allows us to include the set of time dummies along with year and quarter time fixed effects (the 
timing of the law reform did not coincide with the change in calendar year). 
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Therefore, the ߚ௞ coefficients are intended to capture the entire dynamic response of 
foreclosures to the new legal regime, while the country-specific time trends identify pre-
existing trends. The estimates of these coefficients allow us to determine the average 
effect of the law reform on regional foreclosures, and to test whether the effect declines 
(a negative coefficient) or grows (a positive coefficient) over time. Again, we also add 
region fixed effects and year and quarter fixed effects, in addition to the region-specific 
controls, and linear and quadratic region-specific time trends, as in Eq. (1). 
This empirical strategy is similar to that proposed by Wolfers (2006) to analyze 
the effect of the unilateral divorce law reforms in US states; the only difference between 
our approach and Wolfers’ strategy is that in our case the law reform affected all 
regions at the same time (it was a national rule).12, 13 
We estimate Equations (1) and (2) by OLS, with robust standard errors clustered 
by region. Table 2 reports the estimates of the effect of the 2012 law reform on judicial 
foreclosures in absolute (columns 1 and 2) and relative terms (columns 3 and 4). All 
models include all controls. The results for the static model (columns 1 and 3) provide 
contradictory conclusions: while the number of foreclosures declined after the law 
reform, the effect on the ratio of foreclosures per 1,000 inhabitants is positive and 
significant. How is this possible? An explanation could be the decrease in population: 
the total population of Spain significantly reduced from 2012 to 2016. Overall, the 
considerable reduction of almost 400,000 inhabitants (a decrease in 0.8% of the total 
population) was mainly driven by immigrants returning to their countries of origin 
during the recession, and these immigrants were particularly concentrated in those 
regions severely hit by the bursting of the housing market bubble. Therefore, although 
the number of foreclosures declined after the reform, the decrease in regional 
populations pushed the ratio up in some regions.   
                                                 
12
 Marcén (2016) uses this same methodology for considering a legal reform that affected all units 
simultaneously to examine the effect of the Bosman ruling on the presence of native football (soccer) 
players in their home league. 
13
 We do not have a control group within Spain because all units were affected by the law reform at the 
same time. One possible alternative could be to build a synthetic control group following the synthetic 
control method (Abadie et al., 2015). It consists of the comparison of outcomes between units 
representing the case of interest (the Spanish provinces in our case), defined by the occurrence of a 
specific event or intervention that is the object of the study (the law reform), and otherwise similar but 
unaffected units. Comparison units are intended to reproduce the counterfactual of the case of interest in 
the absence of the event or intervention under scrutiny. For instance, Abadie et al. (2015) used a weighted 
average of European countries as a synthetic control for Germany. Nevertheless, in our case it is not easy 
to find comparable units, because, as mentioned in the introduction, many European countries passed 
similar law reforms in that period. 
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Nevertheless, the results for the dynamic effect of the law reform (columns 2 
and 4) are consistent across both measures of foreclosures. Our time dummies reveal a 
negative and significant effect of the law reform on regional foreclosures in the first six 
years after the reform (although for the log-number of foreclosures the effect is only 
significant at the 10% confidence level in years 3 and 4 after the law reform). 
Furthermore, the coefficients indicate that the negative effect increased over time. 
However, from the seventh year onward the coefficient becomes non-significant at the 
5% confidence level in column 2, and even changes to become positive and significant 
for foreclosures per capita in column 4. This suggests that the effectiveness of the policy 
reform vanished seven years after the reform. Therefore, although the law reform 
contributed to a reduction in foreclosures (and evictions), this effect was transitory. 
Regarding the control variables, only the coefficient picking up the effect of 
house prices is significant in all models. Its negative sign points to opportunistic 
behaviour by mortgage debtors: a decrease in house prices in this period implied a rise 
in the number of foreclosures. The impact of the unemployment and inflation rates is 
positive but not significant. 
Next, we explore the impact of the law reform on the mortgage loans market, so 
we re-run Eqs. (1) and (2) considering loans data at the regional level as the dependent 
variable. In particular, we use the log-number of mortgage loans, the number of 
mortgage loans per 1,000 inhabitants, and the log of the average amount of the loan. 
Data on loans are only available from 2007, so our sample size is slightly reduced to 
2,550 observations. Table 3 shows the results for both the static (columns 1, 3 and 5) 
and dynamic (columns 2, 4 and 6) effects of the law reform. The results are quite similar 
for the three measures of mortgage loans. We obtain a negative and significant static 
effect of the law reform in all cases, and the dynamic effects are also negative and 
significant in all the years after the law reform, pointing to a non-transitory effect. 
Moreover, it seems that not only is the effect permanent but the estimated coefficients 
for the time dummies also indicate that the negative effect increases over time. 
Neither of the control variables has a significant effect on the log-number of 
loans. For the loans per capita ratio, the impact of unemployment is negative and 
significant, as expected. A high unemployment rate implies that debtors may have more 
difficulties in making their scheduled payments, and thus financial institutions are more 
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cautious about giving credit. The inflation rate has a positive effect on loans, but it is 
only significant for the average amount of the loan, possibly by means of its influence 
on the real interest rate. 
Figure 4 provides information about the spatial dimension of the impact of the 
law reform on both foreclosures and mortgage loans. Although the change in the law 
affected all regions at the same time, the effect was uneven across units. Figure 4(a) 
shows the average growth in foreclosures after the law reform (from 2012(Q2) to 
2019(Q3)) by region. The blue areas represent regions with lower than average growth 
(negative growth in all cases) in foreclosures, while brown regions are provinces with 
higher than average growth after the law reform. The map reveals an interesting spatial 
pattern, as most of the areas with a growth in foreclosures below the average are located 
in the north (and part of the east) of the country. Nevertheless, provinces that had a 
higher than average growth in foreclosures (after the law reform that diminished 
foreclosures) were those located in the south of the country (with some exceptions). 
This result is fully consistent with the north-south pattern observed in Spain in last 
decades, in which the southern regions (basically, Extremadura and Andalusia) are the 
poorest regions, with the highest unemployment rates. Therefore, although the law 
reform transitorily reduced the number of foreclosures, the regions still showing the 
highest growth in foreclosures were those regions with more low-income individuals. 
Figure 4(b) displays the average growth in loans in the same post-law reform 
period by region. Although in this case the spatial pattern is not so clear, this map can 
be interpreted as an inverse reflection of Figure 4(a) because it shows that the regions in 
which the decrease in loans was higher than average were located, basically, in the 
south (and west) of the country, whereas in the north of the country we find those 
regions with a higher than average growth (even positive in some cases) in mortgage 
loans. Again, the explanation could be related to the lower per-capita income in 
southern regions. If mortgage loans were reduced after the law reform because low-
income individuals were excluded from the credit market, this map indicates that this 
process was especially intense in the poorest regions. 
4. Conclusions 
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From 1999 to 2005 the Spanish housing market was characterised by an extraordinary 
boom, which increased house prices (in euros per m2) by 117%. This housing bubble 
had a crucial role in the impact of the international financial crisis, which began in 
2008, on the Spanish economy. After 2008, during the Great Recession, house prices 
dramatically decreased and unemployment increased. At the same time, the number of 
defaults on the repayment of mortgage loans, and the number of foreclosures and 
evictions, rose significantly.  
The governmental reaction to the wave of foreclosures and evictions was the law 
reform passed in 2012 to protect mortgage debtors, which introduced a new Code of 
Good Practice for banks and financial institutions. After this legal reform, low-income 
debtors who meet certain requirements can rarely be evicted and, in case of default, the 
bank is forced to offer the debtor a restructuring of the debt, or the debtor can even, as a 
last resort, transfer the property over to the bank as an alternative to having the lender 
foreclose on it, thus being allowed to stay in the property as a tenant and paying a 
reduced rent, and avoiding eviction even after foreclosure. 
In this paper, we empirically examine the economic consequences of this legal 
reform. We consider quarterly data from 50 Spanish provinces (NUTS III regions) from 
2001 to 2019(Q3). We use panel data models with regional, year, and quarter fixed 
effects, linear and quadratic region-specific time trends, and other relevant control 
variables at the regional level (house prices, inflation, and unemployment rates), and our 
results reveal that the reform significantly reduced the number of foreclosures, but that 
this effect was transitory, fading six years after the reform. 
Why was the effect on foreclosures not permanent? One possible explanation is 
that the poorest individuals are not owners anymore. Although last years the number of 
owners’ evictions has decreased over time, today it is still larger than the pre-crisis 
level. However, since 2016 there has been a worrying rise in renters’ evictions (in 2019 
the number of renters’ evictions was almost three times that of owners), and this 
dynamic has been observed in different cities (for instance, González-Pérez et al. (2020) 
study on the case of Palma). Taking into account that after foreclosure owners usually 
turn to being renters, this may suggest that low-income individuals are still at severe 
risk of eviction, because when they lose the status of mortgagor debtor they move to the 
rent market, in which tenants can be evicted more easily. Although the Royal Decree-
Law 6/2012 states that the mortgagor can transfer the property of his residence as a 
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means of definitively discharging the debt, and the debtor is allowed to stay in the 
residence as a tenant for two years paying a reduced annual rent, this way avoiding 
eviction after foreclosure, in practice after those two years the rent usually rises 
dramatically. Many of these homes end up being managed by Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (REIT), which have proliferated in Spain since 2012 (from zero REITs in 2012 to 
72 in 2019, see Méndez (2019)), and after the legal period of two years in many cases 
the rent increases by 100% (or even more), forcing the tenant to move or to be evicted 
in the end. Nevertheless, all these movements are not captured by our judicial 
foreclosures data. 
The law reform also reduced access to the credit market, and the negative effects 
on the mortgage loans market are permanent and remain today. As the credit institutions 
tried to accommodate to the post-financial crisis situation by restructuring their financial 
portfolios, reducing the importance of mortgage loans (whose weight was oversized 
during the previous housing boom), new actors have appeared in the Spanish housing 
market last years (Méndez, 2019). Since 2013, and especially from 2017, agreements 
between the most important Spanish banks and foreign capital funds (such as 
BlackRock, Vanguard, Brookfield Asset Management, Cerberus, and Blackstone, 
among others) have facilitated the irruption of these private funds (called in the social 
media ‘vulture funds’) into the Spanish housing market. To diversify their portfolios, 
these funds have bought large packages of housing stocks that banks previously 
acquired after judicial foreclosure. Today, 10 out of the 15 most important property 
developers in the country are controlled by foreign funds (mostly American), closely 
linked to the REITs managing renting in these housing units. Whether the increasing 
market power of these funds in the Spanish housing market is desirable from an 
economic or social point of view is an issue beyond this study. 
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Table 1. Regional average values by year 
Year House price 
Unemployment 
rate 
Inflation 
rate Foreclosures Evictions Loans 
Average 
loan amount
2001 877.42 10.09 3.58 315.24   
2002 984.78 11.11 3.46 314.02    
2003 1,108.66 11.22 2.89 344.14    
2004 1,271.78 10.81 2.92 345.42    
2005 1,439.82 9.32 3.30 327.58    
2006 1,598.26 8.58 3.53 321.94    
2007 1,690.56 8.04 2.73 348.04  21,815.80 237,793.81 
2008 1,705.13 11.00 4.19 410.98  14,317.84 201,955.84 
2009 1,581.79 17.02 -0.57 753.54  14,343.02 162,838.44 
2010 1,538.93 19.10 1.79 1,085  12,177.44 149,741.09 
2011 1,468.96 20.75 3.30 1,295.40  7,814.64 147,045.91 
2012 1,361.19 24.36 2.44 1,507.50  7,035.06 123,621.41 
2013 1,260.83 25.83 1.38 1,469.96 516.22 5,113.68 117,404.98 
2014 1,213.63 24.43 -0.23 1,636.74 577.54 5,399.76 120,586.54 
2015 1,216.32 21.90 -0.68 1,681.88 584.50 6,063.78 130,999.09 
2016 1,220.50 19.44 -0.28 1,454.98 527.94 6,522.36 133,591.98 
2017 1,230.06 17.15 1.99 1,346.08 446.60 6,799.18 138,273.95 
2018 1,247.08 15.20 1.67 1,177.66 378.90 7,438.58 142,761.03 
2019* 1,268.39 14.10 0.73 763.46 213.46 5,486.9 145,407.52 
Notes: House prices in euros per m2. *Data in year 2019 until Q3. 
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Table 2. Static and dynamic effects of the 2012 law reform on foreclosures 
Dependent variable: ln(Foreclosures) Foreclosures per 1,000 inhabitants 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
2012 Law reform -0.254** 0.162*** 
(0.106) (0.022) 
First 2 years -0.254** -0.135*** 
(0.106) (0.017) 
Years 3-4 -0.286* -0.148*** 
(0.159) (0.026) 
Years 5-6 -0.550** -0.255*** 
(0.252) (0.042) 
Years 7-8 -0.562* 0.162*** 
    (until 2019Q3) (0.310) (0.022) 
Unemployment rate 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
Inflation rate 0.013 0.013 0.006 0.006 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.006) (0.006) 
ln (House price) -0.792*** -0.792*** -0.546*** -0.546*** 
(0.206) (0.206) (0.071) (0.071) 
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year x Quarter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region x Time Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region x Time2 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.960 0.960 0.889 0.889 
Observations 3,748 3,748 3,750 3,750 
Notes: Dependent variables: ln(foreclosures) (Columns 1 and 2) and foreclosures per 1,000 
inhabitants (Columns 3 and 4). Quarterly data from 2001 to 2019(Q3). All the models 
include a constant. Robust standard errors clustered by region. Significant at the *10%, 
**5%, ***1% level. The log-foreclosures sample has a different number of observations 
because one region (Teruel) reported zero foreclosures in two quarters. 
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Table 3. Static and dynamic effects of the 2012 law reform on loans 
Dependent variable: ln(Loans) Loans per 1,000 inhabitants 
ln(Average loan 
amount) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
2012 Law reform -0.171*** -0.384*** -0.126** 
(0.040) (0.099) (0.056) 
First 2 years -0.405*** -1.469*** -0.285*** 
(0.019) (0.050) (0.026) 
Years 3-4 -0.675*** -2.622*** -0.336*** 
(0.025) (0.083) (0.036) 
Years 5-6 -0.858*** -3.562*** -0.386*** 
(0.042) (0.135) (0.050) 
Years 7-8 -1.081*** -4.786*** -0.565*** 
    (until 2019Q3) (0.037) (0.132) (0.038) 
Unemployment rate -0.001 -0.001 -0.013** -0.013** -0.002 -0.002 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
Inflation rate -0.005 -0.005 0.055 0.055 0.031** 0.031** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.039) (0.039) (0.012) (0.012) 
ln (House price) 0.016 0.016 -0.862* -0.862* -0.104 -0.104 
(0.141) (0.141) (0.441) (0.441) (0.140) (0.140) 
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year x Quarter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region x Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region x Time2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.994 0.994 0.970 0.970 0.847 0.847 
Observations 2,550 2,550 2,550 2,550 2,550 2,550 
Notes: Dependent variables: ln(loans) (Columns 1 and 2), loans per 1,000 inhabitants 
(Columns 3 and 4) and ln(average loan amount) (Columns 5 and 6). Quarterly data from 
2007 to 2019(Q3). All the models include a constant. Robust standard errors clustered by 
region. Significant at the *10%, **5%, ***1% level.  
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Figure 1. House prices, new mortgages, judicial foreclosures, and evictions 
 
Notes: New mortgages constituted on urban properties. Data sources: Instituto Nacional 
de Estadística (INE), Ministerio de Fomento and Consejo General del Poder Judicial 
(CGPJ). Data in year 2019 until Q3. 
 
Figure 2. Judicial foreclosures by region, 2001–2019(Q3) 
 
Notes: Data source: Consejo General del Poder Judicial (CGPJ). 
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Figure 3. House prices by region, 2001–2019(Q3) 
 
Notes: Data source: Ministerio de Fomento. 
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Figure 4. Average growth in foreclosures and loans after the law reform by region 
 
 
(a) Foreclosures 
 
 
(b) Loans 
 
Note: Average quarterly growth in ln(foreclosures) and ln(loans) after the law reform 
(2012(Q2)–2019(Q3)) 
 
